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Abstract 
In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is 
positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the 
competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of 
distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on 
the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for 
forced CEO turnovers only in the presence of a major variation in the costs this risk generates for 
shareholders and the organization. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the CEOs of large banks have incentives to implement business 
policies that increase their organizations’ exposure to risks (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013; Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). These business policies are motivated by the highly levered nature 
of banks that provides CEOs with risk-taking incentives given the convexity of their stock and 
option holdings.  
While shareholders are not against executives taking risks, because equity is an out-of-the-
money call option whose value is increasing with risk (Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), they do not have a preference for risks that can be detrimental to the survival of 
the bank (Stulz, 2015). A bank’s growing exposure to tail risks, measuring the possibility of 
suffering extremely large losses, could be dangerous for the organization (Cordella and Yeyati, 
2003; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Park and Peristiani, 2007). 
While an exposure to tail risks tends to reward shareholders with positive returns in many 
scenarios, it can also be associated with a small probability of extremely large losses that undermine 
a bank’s longer-term survival (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Thanassoulis, 2013). 
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether increases in tail risk are associated with an 
increased likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in large banks. To this end, we present the first 
cross-country study of CEO turnovers in the banking industry based on a sample of 261 large 
banks selected from 46 countries for the period 2004-2013.  
Whether any link exists between tail risk and the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large banks 
lacks empirical evidence. This is particularly unfortunate given that dismissal is potentially an 
important mechanism to discipline CEOs by bank boards and reduce the chances that they overly 
expose their banks to extreme risks.  In fact, dismissal might lead not only to the loss of current 
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employment but also the loss of unvested equity-based compensation (Dahiya and Yermack, 2008) 
and reduced future career opportunities (Brickley et al., 1999).  
Our analysis is guided by conventional theoretical models proposed for non-financial firms 
where boards employ performance, volatility and other signals to evaluate CEO choices (Bushman 
et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). When these 
signals indicate bad outcomes for the corporation that are imputable to a lack of CEO ability or 
effort in the decision making, the dismissal of the CEO is a likely consequence. Along these lines, 
we argue that tail risk conveys different and additional signals, as compared to stock performance 
and volatility, of possible bad outcomes for the bank that can be related to CEO choices.  
An increasing exposure to tail risks, making a bank more vulnerable to events that can lead to 
extremely large losses and to a financial distress (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), signals that the bank 
might find it more difficult and costly to conduct its business (Stulz, 2015). For instance, increases 
in tail risks lead to additional costs for shareholders related to the monitoring role of bank creditors 
and regulators. Both creditors and regulators do not benefit from the upside gains deriving from 
bank risk-taking while they bear the cost of the downside. It follows that especially in the presence 
of a growing tail risk exposure, creditors can significantly increase the risk-premium charged on 
bank debts and reduce the amount of available funds for the bank (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck et al., 
2011; Stulz, 2015). At the same time, regulators might more closely monitor banks and offer 
negative signals on their financial health with the consequence of reducing share prices and further 
increasing borrowing costs (Berger and Davies, 1998; DeYoung et al., 2001; Slovin et al., 1999). 
In our study we follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) and use Expected 
Shortfall (ES) as our primary measure of bank tail risk. ES quantifies the downside of bank risk in 
the form of extremely large negative stock returns. ES is, therefore, a particularly appropriate signal 
that a bank is overly exposed to extreme risks that are detrimental to bank value. Furthermore, 
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following studies that investigate the role of volatility in CEO dismissal in non-financial 
corporations (Bushman et al., 2010), we build our analysis on the distinction between idiosyncratic 
and systematic tail risk, with the former being seen as more directly linked to managerial choices.   
By focusing on tail risk, our work is related to the stream of research that emphasizes the 
importance of going beyond the investigations of (average) stock returns and profitability in order 
to explain forced CEO turnovers in corporations (see, for instance, Brickley, 2003). This type of 
investigation is the focus of earlier studies on CEO turnovers in the banking industry (see Hubbard 
and Palia, 1995). Furthermore, our paper extends and complements the analysis conducted on 
small US community banks by Schaeck et al. (2011) where the authors show that an increase in 
bank default risk (measured by the accounting Z-score) raises the likelihood of a forced CEO 
turnover due to the disciplinary role played by shareholders.  
Differently from the existing studies, we show the importance of accounting for tail risk in 
examining the decision to remove a CEO by the boards of large banks. We find a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and forced (but not voluntary) CEO turnover, and we 
document that the firing decision is not, in general, related to an exposure to systematic tail risk. 
Furthermore, we show that our result is not related to idiosyncratic tail risk capturing a poor 
performance effect or simply an idiosyncratic volatility effect, as in the model proposed by 
Bushman et al. (2010), and holds under different empirical settings, including changes in the way 
we compute bank tail risk. 
A key consequence of the above results is that the importance of idiosyncratic tail risk for the 
firing decision should depend on the banking market structure as the evaluation of CEO choices 
is argued to be more difficult in more concentrated (less competitive) industries (DeFond and 
Park, 1999; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker 2017). This is because CEOs operating in more concentrated 
industries are less likely to be subject to similar uncertainties (DeFond and Park, 1999), have less 
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peers (Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017), and their outputs are more likely to be 
influenced by the actions of other CEOs in the same industry (Holmstrom, 1982). Consistent with 
the view that the market structure influences the ability of the boards to identify unfit CEOs, we 
find that the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk is lower in more 
concentrated banking markets. 
We next evaluate which stakeholders amplify the importance of tail risk for forced CEO 
turnovers. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on how different bank stakeholders react to 
downside risks in banks (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). We show that the sensitivity of CEO dismissals 
to idiosyncratic tail risk increases with a larger presence of subordinated debtholders (namely 
debtholders that are liable to incur potentially larger losses in the case of a bank distress) or 
shareholders with lower diversification opportunities. In other words, there is a stronger 
relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and CEO dismissal in the presence of stakeholders that 
have more to lose in the case of distress. 
The final part of our analysis looks more closely at a bank’s exposure to systematic tail risk.  In 
the case of large banks, there are specific factors that go against the argument that any exposure 
to systematic tail risk is completely unrelated to managerial choices. In particular, recent banking 
studies suggest that bank CEOs have incentives to manufacture non-firm-specific tail risks and to 
engage in systematic risk-taking (modelled as an endogenous choice) to extract value from the 
financial safety net (Acharya et al., 2017; Acharya and Yorumazer, 2007; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2016; Bushman and Williams, 2015; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006).  
To understand how boards perceive systematic tail risk in large banks, we test for the presence 
of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk when there are changes 
in the consequences a bank can suffer from being exposed to this risk. By using several alternative 
empirical settings, we consistently find that there is a stronger relationship between an exposure 
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to systematic tail risk and CEO dismissal when such exposure is deemed to be more costly for a 
bank. For instance, we find that the sensitivity of CEO forced turnover to systematic tail risk is 
significantly larger after a bank is included in the list of global systemically important financial 
institutions by the Financial Stability Board. For these institutions, regulatory costs are linked to 
the systemic effects they produce (see Bongini et al., 2015) and the removal from the list only 
occurs when they no longer pose a global systemic threat. All in all, our tests indicate that the 
specificities of banks play a crucial role in the way bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail 
risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why tail risks should matter 
for forced CEO turnovers in large banks. Section 3 describes the sample, econometric methods 
and variables. Section 4 examines the impact of a bank’s idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk 
exposure on the likelihood of a CEO turnover, while Section 5 offers conclusions.   
2. CEO Turnovers and the Tail Risk Exposure of Large Banks 
2.1 Tail Risk as a Signal of Bad Managerial Choice 
The existing literature offers little guidance on whether risk, and tail risk in particular, matters 
for the board decision of large banks to fire a CEO. Studies on non-financial corporations have 
mostly emphasized the importance of corporate performance for CEO turnover (Brickley, 2003; 
Chakraborty et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2003; Farell and Whidbee, 2003; Fisman et al., 2014; Guo 
and Masulis, 2015; Hazarika et al., 2012; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). An exception is Bushman et 
al. (2010) who argue that, for a given level of corporate performance, a higher level of idiosyncratic 
volatility is associated with an increase in the probability of a forced CEO turnover as it signals 
uncertainty about CEO talent.  
Similarly, with the exception of Schaeck et al. (2011), who focus on the importance of 
accounting default risk for forced CEO turnovers in US community banks, the limited number of 
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studies on banks has only investigated the influence of performance (Hubbard and Palia, 1995) 
and the role of regulatory scrutiny on the turnover decision (Palvia, 2011; Webb, 2008).  
In general, conventional theoretical models of CEO dismissal are built around the idea that 
boards assess the quality of CEO choices on the basis of performance, volatility and other signals 
(Bushman et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and Kannan, 2015). 
These signals lead to the dismissal of the CEO when they indicate bad outcomes for the 
corporation and when these outcomes are due to a lack of CEO ability or effort in the decision 
making (bad choices). Using this setting as a starting point, we expect that increasing a bank’s tail 
risk is associated with an increased likelihood of a forced CEO turnover. In other words, we 
postulate that tail risk offers signals of possible bad outcomes for the corporation that are not 
contained in measures of performance and volatility and that are the result of CEO (bad) choices.  
In respect to the above, the extant literature shows that a bank’s exposure to tail risks is 
conventionally seen as signalling a risk exposure that may be excessive (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Park and Peristiani, 2007). More 
precisely, shareholders want the CEO to take risks that are not detrimental to the corporation 
(Stulz, 2015), while an exposure to tail risks signals that a bank can be subject to extremely negative 
events that might threaten its survival. Furthermore, a growing exposure to tail risks can also affect 
the short-term value of the bank by leading to funding restrictions by creditors (especially if they 
are not protected by deposit insurance) and to increases in  funding costs (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck 
et al., 2011; Stulz, 2015). 
 In addition, and differently from non-financial firms, banks are subject to monitoring by 
regulators who are concerned with the effects of bank tail risks on financial stability. An increased 
regulatory scrutiny due to tail risks has the potential to negatively influence shareholder wealth in 
several ways. Specifically, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that supervisory inspections that convey 
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bad news lead to an increase in the borrowing costs of large commercial banks, while Berger and 
Davies (1998) and Slovin et al. (1999) find that negative regulatory assessments are associated with 
a decline in stock prices. Moreover, in the presence of an excessive risk exposure, regulators have 
the power to prohibit certain bank activities, to dismiss bank managers and even to close down 
the bank (De Young et al., 2001; Schaeck et al., 2011).3  
In summary, an increasing exposure to tail risks amplifies bank distress costs and leads to the 
probability of losses in bank value caused by the monitoring role of bank creditors and regulators. 
It follows that a board should consider firing the CEO whenever a growing exposure to tail risks 
is associated with a lack of CEO ability or effort in terms of risk-management. 
2.2 Sources of Tail Risks and Forced CEO Turnovers 
In understanding the drivers of the decision to fire a CEO, conventional theoretical models of 
non-financial firms highlight the importance of distinguishing the sources of a firm’s risk exposure. 
CEO choices are normally expected to influence the idiosyncratic component, but not the 
systematic component of risk. Accordingly, any type of systematic risk (including tail risk) should 
be seen as a manifestation of an exogenous event and as such not relevant to the firing decision. 
This is highlighted by models of CEO turnover based on the relative performance evaluation 
framework (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013; Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). 
Further, using a different theoretical setting, Bushman et al. (2010) argue that, differently from 
                                                 
3 Regulatory influence is confirmed in a cross-country setting by a 2012 World Bank survey. The survey shows 
that in the presence of excessively risky policies, regulators might impose costly actions for shareholders such as a 
stop to dividend payments or the enforcement of a capital restoration plan. Furthermore, around 90% of the national 
supervisors have the powers to exercise enforcement actions that lead to the removal of bank managers and directors. 
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idiosyncratic volatility, an increase in systematic volatility reduces the likelihood of a forced 
turnover as it makes it more problematic for boards to infer indications of CEO talent.  
There are, however, some specificities in the case of the tail risk of large banks that suggest 
some exposures to systematic sources of risk may be related to CEO choices.4 For instance, the 
presence of implicit and explicit government guarantees within the banking industry can induce 
bank CEOs to favor business policies that increase a bank’s exposure to systematic tail risks or 
generate systematic tail risks (see Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006). Specifically, Pennacchi 
(2006) argues that banks are inclined to favor lending and off-balance sheet activities with high 
exposure to systematic risks, as these business choices increase the value of their deposit insurance 
subsidy. In addition, Bushman and Williams (2015) demonstrate that, via their loan loss 
recognition policy, bank managers generate tail risks that have negative implications for the whole 
banking industry. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2010) argue that the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 
is primarily the consequence of large and complex financial institutions manufacturing systematic 
tail risks.  
Nevertheless, the fact that exposure to systematic tail risk may be related to managerial choices 
does not necessarily imply that this exposure should matter for bank CEO dismissal.  In fact, by 
increasing the exposure to systematic tail risks, a bank can increase the probability of receiving a 
government bailout that transfers the bank’s losses to taxpayers. This is because these losses 
materialize in periods when other banks are also in trouble and regulators intend to preserve 
                                                 
4 A possible endogeneity is, for instance, recognized within the macro-prudential view of banking regulation that 
has grown in importance post the global financial crisis (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Under this approach large banks are 
subject to additional rules and discipline motivated by the potential effects of their risk-taking on overall financial 
stability and not simply on the stability of individual banks.  
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confidence in the banking industry by avoiding bank failures (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). 
Furthermore, an increasing exposure to systematic tail risks increases the probability of delaying 
the closure of a bank in distress, as the distress typically occurs in periods when regulators aim to 
avoid panic (see e.g. Acharya, 2009; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Bolton et al., 2015; Brown 
and Dinc, 2011). It follows that an exposure to systematic tail risks may be perceived by bank 
boards as being less damaging and dangerous than an exposure to idiosyncratic tail risks.  
 To summarize, the arguments indicating that bank boards should account for bank tail risk in 
the CEO firing decision should be primarily valid for the idiosyncratic component of this risk. 
Differently from systematic tail risk, idiosyncratic tail risk is not only more likely to be seen as a 
result of a lack of CEO ability or effort in managing risks but might also be seen as more likely to 
be detrimental for shareholders and the bank. 
3. Data, Econometric and Variables   
3.1 Data 
The analysis is based on a sample of listed, large commercial banks and bank holding companies 
with accounting data available from BankScope by Bureau van Dijk and market data available from 
Datastream International. We select the sampled banks from an initial list that included the top 
500 listed large commercial banks and bank holding companies in terms of total assets at the end 
of 2004, as identified by BankScope. Our sample period is from 2004 to 2013. From this initial list 
we retain only banks for which we are able to collect governance data (including data on CEOs) 
from annual and governance reports. We also search for governance information from various 
relevant databases, such as Bloomberg, Business Week, Forbes and S&P Capital IQ. This reduces 
the sample size to approximately 300 banks. 
As explained in the next section, our empirical model employs lagged explanatory variables to 
estimate the likelihood of a CEO turnover. Therefore, the first CEO turnover event we record 
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occurs in January 2005 and the last turnover occurs in December 2013. This results in an initial 
sample of 342 turnover events. We then exclude turnovers where a temporary CEO was appointed 
during a time of transition or turnovers that were associated with mergers occurring over the same 
period.  
Next, we classify the remaining turnovers as forced or voluntary by conducting a manual search 
of news articles that explain the reason for each outgoing CEO. Our final classification follows 
Huson et al. (2001) and Parrino (1997). 5  Furthermore, to minimize classification errors, we 
conduct additional investigations to validate whether the turnover was voluntary; namely, 
explaining if it was motivated by retirement, resignation for personal reasons or to pursue a new 
business, or by the outgoing CEO taking up another post in the same firm or a new job elsewhere. 
Finally, we remove turnovers where no reliable data could be found for the reason behind the 
CEO’s departure.  
After imposing the described selection criteria, our final sample consists of accounting and 
market data for 1,994 observations (261 unique banks chartered in 46 countries) from 2004 to 
2012 and includes 74 forced turnovers and 198 voluntary turnovers for the period 2005-2013. Our 
sample size is similar to two recent cross-country studies that focus on the cross-sectional 
relationship between bank governance and performance during the global financial crisis (see 
                                                 
5 We classify a CEO turnover as forced if any of the following conditions are met: a) the announcement reports 
that the departing CEO was fired or dismissed; b) the outgoing CEO left because of poor performance, had a conflict 
of opinion with the board, or was under pressure from the board due to accounting scandals; c) the outgoing CEO is 
under the retirement age of 60 years but does not leave the firm for health reasons or to take up another job outside 
the firm; d) the turnover resulted from re-organization or re-structuring attempts initiated by the board or the 
government. 
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Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). The proportion of forced turnovers is in line with 
the figures reported by studies on non-financial firms (Bushman et al., 2010; Jenter and Kannan, 
2015). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country. As in previous cross-country 
studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012), a large number of banks are concentrated in 
Japan and the US, representing 16.75% and 16.80% of the total number of observations, 
respectively. For the remaining countries, the share in terms of total observations does not exceed 
5%. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of turnovers by year and there is no obvious trend 
in CEO turnovers. 
3.2 Econometric Method 
In our sample of CEO turnovers, there are two key CEO exit mechanisms: 1) forced 2) 
voluntary. The two types of turnovers are mutually exclusive and compete with each other as 
potential exit mechanisms for managers in a given bank. Therefore, following Gregory-Smith et 
al. (2009) and Hazarika et al. (2012) and using the complete data about firms with no CEO 
turnover, forced turnovers and voluntary turnovers, we adopt a competing risks hazard model to 
account for the fact that forced turnovers are not the only exit mechanism for CEOs. 
The dependent variable of the model is CEO tenure (defined as the number of years a CEO 
held his/her chief executive position) and all independent variables are lagged by one year to 
reduce simultaneity and endogeneity concerns. Under this empirical setting, the impact of each 
determinant varies for different types of CEO turnover. We describe the covariates used in our 
empirical analysis in the following sections.   
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3.3 Measuring Bank Idiosyncratic and Systematic Tail Risk 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) we use Expected Shortfall (ES) as 
our primary measure of a bank’s tail risk exposure. ES quantifies the downside of bank risk in the 
form of extreme negative stock returns.   
We estimate idiosyncratic and systematic ES using the historical approach based on realized 
returns. The historical approach relies on the assumption that the realized exposure to extreme risks 
offers valuable indications on the expected exposure to these risks. In line with this view, Acharya 
et al. (2017) show that measures of extreme bank risk computed before the crisis predicted stock 
performance during the global crisis. ES is a common tool used in bank financial risk management 
(Acharya et al., 2017; Yamai and Yoshiba, 2005) where the historical approach is widely applied. 
For instance, Perignon and Smith (2010) show that historical simulation is by far the most popular 
estimation method employed by large banks over the period 1996-2005 to quantify their exposure 
to extreme market risks.  
More formally, for bank i, ES is (minus) the average daily return below the 5th percentile of the 
yearly distribution (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Van Bekkum, 2016) and can be expressed as:6 
ESi
𝛼=-E[Ri,t|Ri,t < Ri,t
𝛼]      (1) 
where Ri,t is the daily stock return for bank i at day t and Ri,t
𝛼  is a bank’s daily stock return equal to 
the 𝛼  percentile (equal to the 5th percentile in our analysis) of the year t distribution. 
Conventionally, as shown in (1), to compute ES the average of the daily stock returns in the lower 
                                                 
6 For instance, with 200 daily stock returns and a 5th percentile equal to -2%, ES is the average daily return in the 
trading days where the daily stock returns are lower than -2%.  
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tail of the return distribution is multiplied by minus one such that higher values of ES indicate a 
higher bank exposure to extreme negative returns.  
However, as our predictions depend on the nature of a bank’s tail risk exposure, we need to 
estimate the idiosyncratic and systematic components of ES. To this end, we start by extracting 
the idiosyncratic component of bank daily stock returns via the residuals of an augmented market 
model, where daily bank returns are regressed on market returns and industry returns (both based 
on domestic indexes provided by Datastream) as shown below:  
Ri,t=𝛽1+ 𝛽2Rm,t+𝛽3Rb,t+εj,t       (2) 
where Ri,t is the return for stock i at time t, Rm,t is the daily return for the market index for each 
country, Rb,t is the daily return for the banking industry index for each country. 
We then compute idiosyncratic (systematic) ES using the residuals (the predicted values) 
obtained from equation (2) that captures the time series of idiosyncratic (systematic) returns. As a 
result, following equation (1), Idiosyncratic ES is the average idiosyncratic return below the 5th 
percentile of the yearly distribution of the residuals (𝜀ĵ,t)  from the market model. Whereas 
Systematic ES is the average return below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution of the predicted 
returns from the market model (𝑖. 𝑒. , ?̂?1+ ?̂?2Rm,t+?̂?3Rb,t).    
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of our tail risk measures for three different groups 
of banks: banks with no CEO turnovers, banks with at least one forced CEO turnover, and banks 
with at least one voluntary CEO turnover. The mean idiosyncratic (systematic) ES for banks that 
experienced forced turnovers is 2.25% (3.50%), as compared to 2.06% (2.94%) for banks with no 
turnovers and the difference is statistically significant. By contrast, the mean (median) idiosyncratic 
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ES and systematic ES for banks with voluntary CEO turnovers are not statistically different from 
those of banks with no CEO turnovers.  
3.4 Bank Stock Performance and Volatility 
Previous studies show that CEO dismissals are extreme forms of pay-performance sensitivity, 
where poor performance leads to a greater likelihood of turnover (Huson et al., 2001; Parrino, 
1997). As our tail risk measures are based on the yearly stock return distribution, their impact on 
dismissal might then simply be the result of a poor performance effect. 
In our empirical setting we, therefore, account for stock performance. We construct measures 
of idiosyncratic and systematic stock returns based on the approach followed by Jenter and 
Kannan (2015). Specifically, we compute idiosyncratic and systematic stock returns by annualizing 
daily values of predicted and residual stock returns using equation (2).  
Despite tail risk and volatility being closely related, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) 
demonstrate that they can be affected differently by bank decisions in terms of business mix and 
by the degree of correlation among different forms of risk exposure.7 Nevertheless, previous 
studies show that stock volatility matters for the firing decision in non-financial firms (see, for 
instance, Bushman et al., 2010). Accordingly, we also control for a volatility effect by including in 
the model idiosyncratic and systematic volatility components that we compute at a yearly frequency 
for the residual and predicted returns from equation (2). 
                                                 
7 Specifically, for a typical large internationally active bank, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) demonstrate that 
different combinations of market, credit and operational risk exposures lead to a similar degree of bank volatility but 
different exposures to tail risk. This is because, typically, market risk exposures are characterized by higher volatility 
but shorter fat-tails in their distribution, while credit risk and operational risk exposures show an opposite pattern.  
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While Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for our measures of stock performance 
and volatility, Panel C shows their (Pearson and Spearman) correlation coefficients with tail risk 
measures. All tail risk measures show a relatively low degree of correlation with measures of 
idiosyncratic and systematic performance, whereas they are clearly more correlated with volatility 
components.8 In general, the correlation analysis confirms that tail risk and volatility, though 
correlated, capture different features of a bank’s risk exposure. 
3.5 Other Controls 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the other bank fundamentals that are potential determinants of CEO 
turnover (see Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Parrino, 1997; Schaeck et al., 2011). We control for 
accounting performance, based on a bank’s ROA, since a short-term profit measure is usually a 
key predictor of CEO dismissal (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Parrino, 1997). We also include 
industry ROA since poor industry performance also results in an increasing CEO dismissal risk 
(Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Schaeck et al., 2011). We measure bank-specific accounting 
performance as a bank’s ROA minus the mean ROA of the domestic banking sector (Profitability) 
and include the mean ROA (Industry Profitability) at the country level to account for general 
(systematic) industry performance. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 We control for the size of a bank (Bank Size) by the log of total assets (in thousands of US 
dollars). Larger banks have a bigger pool of talented executives to replace the existing CEO and 
                                                 
8  More precisely the Pearson correlation coefficient between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) returns is -0.34 (-0.37). The Pearson correlation between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) volatility is approximately 0.81 (0.82).  
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this should lead to a larger probability of CEO turnover (Chakraborty et al., 2007). We also include 
bank size squared, as we find evidence of a non-linearity in the relationship between CEO 
turnovers and size. Next, we control for the capital strength of a bank (Bank Capital), measured by 
the ratio between the book value of equity and the book value of bank assets, and a bank’s charter 
value (Charter Value), measured as the sum of the market value of a bank’s equity and the total 
book value of a bank’s liabilities all scaled by the book value of a bank’s assets. Lower equity capital 
and charter values (signaling lower growth opportunities) may trigger an increased risk-taking and 
greater levels of regulatory pressure to replace poorly performing CEOs (Schaeck et al., 2011).  
Panel B shows measures of bank internal governance and of external monitoring that can also 
impact the dismissal risk of CEOs (Laux, 2008; Yermack, 1996). For instance, smaller boards are 
associated with better performance and a greater threat of CEO dismissal (see, for instance, 
Yermack, 1996). More independent boards are expected to be more likely to challenge and replace 
an underperforming CEO (Laux, 2008; Weisbach, 1988), although entrenched CEOs may exert 
power over the board and reduce the likelihood of termination (Berger et al., 1997; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). Accordingly, we control for the log of the number of board members (Board Size) 
and for the degree of board independence (Independent Directors) measured by the ratio between 
independent directors and total board members. We include an index of CEO power (CEO Power) 
based on the sum of two binary variables: a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was internally 
promoted and a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board. 
We expect that more powerful CEOs are less likely to be dismissed.  
Next, we control for the percentage of shares held by insiders excluding the CEO (Insider 
Ownership). Higher levels of insider ownership result in internalizing the costs of bank default 
(Booth et al., 2002) and are likely to lead to a greater likelihood of CEO dismissal (Huson et al., 
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2001). However, higher levels of insider ownership could also lead to entrenchment and reduce 
the level of monitoring and discipline of CEOs (Denis et al., 1997; Goyal and Park, 2002).  
CEO turnovers might also depend on the strength of the risk governance within a bank. Risk 
committees (and the Chief Risk Officer) evaluate and communicate to the board the impact of 
managerial policies on the risk-profile of the bank (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Keys et al., 2009). 
We measure the strength of the risk-management function (Risk Governance) as the sum of two 
binary variables that take a value of one if there is a risk committee and if there is a Chief Risk 
Officer. 
We finally control for two sources of the external monitoring of bank managers. First, we 
control for the influence of bank regulation (Booth et al., 2002; Schaeck et al., 2011) by including 
the general strength of the supervisory agency (Supervisory Power) from Barth et al. (2004) and the 
subsequent surveys conducted by the World Bank.9 Second, we control for the percentage of bank 
stock owned by institutional investors (Institutional Ownership). Institutional shareholders can 
discipline firm management by the threat of exit (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and 
Manso, 2011) and are likely to show better skills in assessing CEOs relative to their peers. 
Finally, Panel C reports additional country controls. The first is the concentration of the 
banking market (Bank Concentration) measured as the log transformation of the Herfindahl index 
of bank deposits in each country. In less concentrated markets there could be a higher likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover, as board members can accurately benchmark CEO performance to peers 
and identify poorly performing executives (DeFond and Park, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002; 
                                                 
9 In the case of banks, another source of monitoring is the presence of subordinated debt-holders. While we do 
not control for this in our preferred specification, due to the large number of missing values in our dataset, we conduct 
additional tests in section 4.5 where this disciplinary channel is explicitly taken into account. 
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Holmstrom, 1982). Further, a more concentrated market might indicate a lower number of peers 
in the external market for executives, with a consequent increase in the difficulty of replacing an 
incumbent CEO (Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017). 
We then include a country-level index from the World Bank database on Doing Business 
(Director Liability Index) that measures the power of shareholders to implicate directors for self-
interested behavior. We expect a greater likelihood of CEO turnover in countries where 
shareholder power is higher. We also control for the degree of regulatory restrictions placed on 
bank activities (Activity Restrictions) from the World Bank regulatory dataset. In countries with a 
more complex banking business, bank boards could find it more difficult to understand a bank’s 
business model and the related signals for the firing decision.   
Next, the GDP per capita (Development) accounts for the degree of economic development of a 
country that might affect the monitoring ability of stakeholders and consequently the probability 
of forced turnovers. We use the ratio between the fiscal balance and country GDP (Fiscal Capacity) 
to capture the possibility that countries with a larger budget balance are more likely to extend 
government guarantees to weak banks (Brown and Dinc, 2011). As in Houston et al. (2010), we 
also control for country size (Size of Economy) through the log of domestic GDP in millions of US 
dollars to account for the fact that a few large economies may be driving our results and for the 
inflation rate (Inflation).   
4.  Tail Risk and CEO Turnover 
4.1 Does a Bank’s Tail Risk Exposure Matter? 
We begin our empirical analysis by first estimating a baseline specification for the full sample 
of CEO turnovers with idiosyncratic and systematic ES as the key explanatory variables and 
controlling for bank fundamentals (including stock return and volatility components) and country 
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characteristics. We then extend the baseline specification with the addition of measures of internal 
and external monitoring mechanisms that might affect the firing decision (column (2)).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results, reported in Table 4, provide consistent evidence that the hazard rate of a forced 
CEO turnover is positively associated with idiosyncratic bank tail risk: idiosyncratic ES enters all 
models with a positive coefficient that is significant at customary levels.10 In contrast, idiosyncratic 
and systematic ES are not significantly associated with the hazard of a voluntary turnover.11 Hence, 
a CEO’s decision to voluntarily leave a bank is not associated with the bank’s exposure to tail risk. 
Our results for forced turnovers are also economically significant: a one standard deviation 
increase in idiosyncratic ES leads to an increase in CEO dismissal risk by approximately 61% using 
the coefficients obtained from model (2).12 Moreover, all these tests show that systematic tail risk 
does not influence CEO forced turnover.   
A possible interpretation of our findings is that an increase in the probability of a forced 
turnover might induce managers to increase idiosyncratic tail risk as an extreme attempt to boost 
                                                 
10 Our results are not affected by the correlation between the tail risk and volatility components. We achieve similar 
conclusions when we re-estimate the models without idiosyncratic and systematic volatility as control variables. 
11 In untabulated tests we find this conclusion also holds when we follow Acharya et al. (2017) and replace our 
measure of systematic tail risk with the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES); namely, the expected bank return when 
the market is under distress conditions. We compute MES as the average bank return in trading days when the market 
daily return is below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution. 
12 The coefficients reported in Table 4 reflect the increase/decrease in the log cause-specific hazards ratio. 
Therefore, we exponentiate the coefficients and then calculate the economic significance.  
  
20 
value. However, the existing literature does not generally show that an increasing risk of dismissal 
increases the risk appetite of CEOs. In fact, Chakraborty (2007) shows the contrasting result that 
corporate risk-taking increases when CEOs have a higher job security. Furthermore, in the Online 
Appendix, similarly to Chakraborty (2007), we document that an increase in CEO dismissal risk is 
not associated with increases in bank tail risk, including idiosyncratic tail risk.  
The above test, however, does not rule out another possible interpretation based on Weisbach 
(1988). He observes that stock returns incorporate the expectations that a CEO will be fired. 
Accordingly, the returns of a bank managed by a CEO that will be fired are higher than they would 
be otherwise. The anticipation effect embedded in stock returns also influences tail risk and 
volatility. In essence, when the market anticipates a forced turnover, a bank’s return distribution 
changes leading to tail risk and volatility being informative on CEO dismissal while stock returns 
are not (as in our analysis).  While in section 4.2, we show that our results remain valid when we 
employ an accounting based measure of tail risk that, as argued by Weisbach (1988), should be less 
affected by any anticipation effect, we acknowledge the difficulties in fully ruling out an 
interpretation based on this effect.  
Moving onto the analysis of the control variables, we find that numerous variables are 
significantly related to the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large banks. Consistent with Bushman 
et al. (2010), we find that idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with the likelihood of a 
forced turnover while it is not significantly related to voluntary turnovers. Furthermore, CEOs at 
large banks are more likely to experience forced turnovers. Moreover, in most of the specifications, 
CEOs at banks with higher capital ratios are less likely to be fired or to voluntarily leave a bank, 
while higher charter values (signaling more growth opportunities) are associated with a reduced 
probability of CEO dismissal. The likelihood of a forced turnover, but not of a voluntary turnover, 
is also lower in banks with a higher profitability.  
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In terms of bank governance, as in the literature on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 
2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Helwege et al., 2012; Parrino et al., 2003), we find that an increase 
in CEO power is associated with a reduced likelihood of both forced and voluntary turnovers, 
while higher levels of institutional ownership are more (less) likely to be associated with a CEO 
being fired (leaving voluntarily). As far as country controls are concerned, similarly to DeFond and 
Park (1999) and Goyal and Park (2002) for non-financial firms, in most of the specifications we 
find that the likelihood of a forced turnover is negatively associated with the degree of banking 
market concentration. Finally, forced turnovers occur more frequently in more shareholder-
oriented countries as indicated by higher values of the director liability index.  
In general, the results of this section suggest that idiosyncratic tail risk is significantly associated 
with the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover and offers incremental information as compared to 
accounting and market measures of performance and, more importantly,  idiosyncratic volatility. 
4.2 Is the Idiosyncratic Tail Risk Effect Different from a Poor Idiosyncratic Performance Effect? 
A possible explanation for our finding still remains that our measures of idiosyncratic ES (based 
on extreme negative returns) are to some extent capturing an effect due to low idiosyncratic stock 
returns. We conduct a series of tests to further demonstrate that idiosyncratic tail risk has an effect 
on forced CEO turnover independently from realized idiosyncratic stock performance. 
Specifically, we start by focusing on a sub-sample of banks that excludes low idiosyncratic 
returns (based on the sample median) and re-estimate the competing risks hazard model for this 
sub-sample. As shown in column (1) of Table 5, we still find that idiosyncratic tail risk is associated 
(at the 10% level) with a greater hazard of CEO dismissal, while systematic tail risk does not matter 
for CEO dismissals. Therefore, the impact of idiosyncratic tail risk on forced turnover is also 
observable when we exclude poorly performing banks.  
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We next construct a sub-sample of banks that exclude those institutions with (simultaneously) 
low idiosyncratic performance (below the sample median) and high idiosyncratic volatility (above 
the sample median) to control for the possibility that our above finding is motivated by a high 
volatility effect. Again, we still find that idiosyncratic tail risk is significant (at the 10% level) in our 
model. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As a further robustness check, we repeat our analysis by using alternative extreme risk measures 
that, as shown in the Online Appendix, have a much lower correlation with measures of realized 
idiosyncratic stock performance (and volatility). We start by following Bushman and Williams 
(2015) that employ Skewness as an alternative market-based measure of extreme risk. Next, we 
employ a risk measure focusing on extreme accounting returns (Accounting Downside Risk). This 
measure is computed as a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank’s ROA is below the 
5th percentile of the estimated earnings distribution that we assume follows a normal distribution 
and we build on the basis of a seven year rolling window of accounting returns starting from 2000. 
Consistent with our main analysis, we then compute the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) and non-firm-
specific (systematic) risk measures. We still find that forced CEO turnover is limited to the firm-
specific component of tail risk.13 
 
 
                                                 
13 The literature (see, for instance, Van Bekkum (2016)) often employs directly the negative value of the stock 
return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the distribution of daily stock returns (defined as a bank’s VaR ) as a 
measure of tail risk. In the Online Appendix, we show that our key results remain unchanged also when VaR is used 
as a tail risk measure. 
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4.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
We conduct various additional tests to check the robustness of our key findings. We report the 
results of these additional tests in the Online Appendix. We first address the concern that our 
results may be sensitive to using a competing risks hazard model. We, therefore, estimate a 
multinomial logit model that is commonly employed by the prior literature on the determinants of 
executive turnovers (Huson et al., 2001). Second, we use a simple Cox hazard model whereby we 
focus only on forced CEO turnovers and treat all voluntary turnovers as censored observations, 
as in Brookman and Thistle (2009) and Jenter and Kannan (2015). The results of these tests 
confirm that our primary findings still hold.  
Next, we stipulate that a CEO should be in charge for at least two consecutive years before 
experiencing a turnover event. Hence, we exclude all observations where CEO turnovers took 
place less than two years after a new CEO was appointed. Again, we do not find any change in 
our findings.  
In our sample period numerous countries experienced a systemic crisis as identified by Laeven 
and Valencia (2013). It is often argued that CEO dismissals during crises may be a response by 
boards to increasing public vitriol and regulatory scrutiny into holding executives responsible for 
mismanagement.14 To control for the influence of systemic banking crises on our results, we 
include a dummy (Crisis) variable that takes the value of one for every year-country combination 
                                                 
14 See for example, ‘Bank chiefs in the firing line’, The Independent, 30 Oct 2007; ‘Royal Bank of Scotland chiefs 
to be forced out under bailout deal’, The Telegraph, 8 Oct 2008; ‘5% Of Latest Bank Of America Bailout Used To 
Pay Merrill Lynch Bonuses (BAC)’, Business Insider, 22 Jan 2009; ‘US watchdog calls for bank executives to be 
sacked’, The Guardian, 5 April 2009.  
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identifying a systemic banking crisis. Our primary findings remain similar as regards the positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and the likelihood of CEO dismissals.  
4.4 Does the Importance of Idiosyncratic Tail Risk on Forced Turnovers depend on the Banking Market 
Structure? 
Our results are consistent with the view that a bank board learns about the CEO’s decision 
making via the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk. A key implication deriving from such a result is 
that the importance assigned to idiosyncratic tail risk should depend on the market structure within 
which the bank operates. 
Specifically, previous studies on non-financial firms argue that the importance assigned to 
signals related to CEO choices becomes lower when the industry concentration is higher (Brickley, 
2003; DeFond and Park, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002) as the assessment of CEO decision making 
is better facilitated in competitive environments. Furthermore, more concentrated markets tend 
to be characterized by greater difficulties in replacing an incumbent CEO because of the lower 
number of peers in the external market for executives (Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 
2017). 
While the existing empirical evidence focuses on the interplay between performance and market 
structure, a similar argument should hold for idiosyncratic tail risk. In this section, we test this 
conjecture by extending our baseline specification with interaction terms between idiosyncratic 
and systematic ES and our measure of banking market concentration.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results reported in column (1) of Table 6 show that the coefficient of Idiosyncratic ES * Bank 
Concentration is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that in more concentrated 
banking markets, large banks are less likely to dismiss CEOs when idiosyncratic tail risk increases. 
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The results also appear economically relevant: an increase in the degree of bank concentration 
from the lowest quartile (i.e. countries with low concentration) to the highest quartile (i.e. countries 
with high concentration) is associated with a reduction in the sensitivity of forced turnovers to 
idiosyncratic tail risk by 54% for a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic tail risk for 
model (1). Furthermore, as shown in column (2), we achieve a similar result when we employ the 
(log of) market share in the deposit market of the four largest banks in a given country as an 
alternative measure of banking market concentration. 
Overall, in line with the prior evidence that indicates concentration reduces the sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnovers to relative performance in non-financial firms (DeFond and Park, 1999; 
Goyal and Park, 2002), we show that in the case of the banking industry, market concentration is 
also associated with a reduced sensitivity of CEO dismissals to idiosyncratic tail risk. 
4.5 Which Bank Stakeholders Care More about Idiosyncratic Tail Risk? 
In this section we evaluate which bank stakeholders are associated with an increased sensitivity 
of CEO turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk. We look at the role played by bank uninsured creditors, 
inside shareholders, regulators and institutional investors. To capture the influence of uninsured 
creditors, we focus on subordinated debtholders since they are subject to a larger risk of suffering 
losses than other bank creditors and are a key source of discipline for bank executives (Ashcraft, 
2008; Goyal, 2005; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
Insiders might have a lower tolerance for idiosyncratic tail risk since they have limited 
diversification opportunities (Gao, 2010). Consequently, a higher level of insider ownership might 
result in internalizing the costs of a bank default (Booth et al., 2002) and lead to a decline in the 
expected utility of pursuing risky policies (Faccio et al., 2011). In short, bank insiders might fear 
the costs associated with idiosyncratic tail risk more than other types of bank shareholders. 
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Under the micro-prudential view of banking regulation, increased supervisory power should be 
associated with a larger sensitivity of CEO turnover to idiosyncratic tail risk. More controversial 
is the possible role of institutional investors. While they might have better skills in monitoring 
bank management than other shareholders, the fact that institutional investors usually hold 
diversified portfolios might reduce the importance assigned to idiosyncratic tail risk when assessing 
CEO performance.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
To conduct the empirical tests, we estimate models with interaction terms between the selected 
variables and tail risk measures. The results, reported in Table 7, suggest that some types of bank 
stakeholders might be more important than others in exercising discipline in terms of idiosyncratic 
tail risk. Specifically, an increase in the share of subordinated debt in a bank’s capital structure or 
in inside ownership is associated with an increased sensitivity of CEO turnover to idiosyncratic 
tail risk but this sensitivity does not vary with the strength of supervisory power or the importance 
of institutional shareholders.  
Overall, the results discussed in this section are not surprising when compared to US-based 
studies on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Kaplan and 
Minton, 2012; Parrino et al., 2003). Nevertheless, we caution drawing conclusions from the 
reported findings given the cross-country heterogeneity in bank governance structures in our 
sample.   
4.6 Do Bank Boards See Systematic Tail Risk as Fully Unrelated to CEO Choices? 
We next evaluate when systematic tail risk is important for the firing decision. This additional 
analysis is motivated by a growing body of banking research showing that systematic tail risks are 
not necessarily exogenous to bank behavior (see, for instance, Acharya et al., 2010; Farhi and 
Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006). 
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Our approach is to test for the presence of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover 
to systematic tail risk when there are changes in the consequences a bank can suffer from being 
exposed to such risks. A variation in the sensitivity of forced turnover to systematic tail risks in 
the presence of these changes would suggest that an exposure to systematic tail risk is related, at 
least in part, to CEO choices.  
To conduct this additional analysis, we consider three different settings. The first two settings 
identify contexts where shareholders might see being exposed to systematic tail risk as more costly. 
We start by focusing on the period post 2010 when there was greater regulatory and policy 
attention to systemic matters related to large financial institutions However, it can be argued that 
the post 2010 environment also witnessed other broader economic changes that may result in a 
weaker identification. In an attempt to provide a more refined test, we next focus on the 
institutions in our sample included in the list of global systemically important financial institutions 
by the Financial Stability Board since 2010. For these institutions regulatory costs are closely 
related to systemic effects. The inclusion in this list is seen negatively by shareholders (see Bongini 
et al., 2015) and banks can be removed only when they do not pose a global systemic threat. 
Accordingly, our expectation is that if CEO choices are seen as influencing a bank’s exposure 
to systematic tail risk, we should observe an increase in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
systematic tail risk post-2010 and, more importantly, for banks that are identified as globally 
systemically important. To conduct our analysis, we first interact our measures of tail risk with a 
dummy equal to one for the years after 2010. Next, we repeat a similar test using a dummy (SIFI) 
equal to one for global systemically important financial institutions.  
In a third test, we use the cross-country variation in the adoption of blanket guarantees by 
governments on banks debts. Under a blanket guarantee, a government offers protection against 
a bank default to creditors that are not conventionally protected by deposit insurance. The purpose 
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is to prevent negative externalities arising from correlated bank defaults (Laeven and Valencia, 
2012). Under a blanket guarantee, the mispricing of government guarantees is more pronounced 
and banks have more possibilities to extract value from the financial safety net via their risk-taking. 
To extract value, however, banks have to avoid closure by regulators and, thereby, benefit from 
forbearance (Allen and Saunders, 1993; Ronn and Verma, 1986). This is more likely when banks 
increase their exposure to non-firm-specific risks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and 
Dinç, 2011). In the presence of a blanket guarantee, we should, therefore, observe a decrease in 
the sensitivity of a forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk if CEO choices can influence the 
exposure to this risk. To conduct this third test, we employ a dummy (Blanket Guarantee) that equals 
one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured.15 We then include 
this dummy and its interaction with the tail risk measures as additional explanatory variables in our 
models.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show the key findings of the first and the second tests, while 
column (3) reports the results of the third test. In general, the results suggest that an exposure to 
systematic tail risk is, at least, partially related to CEO choices.16 The interaction terms between 
                                                 
15 In our sample 15 countries used blanket guarantees. Data on blanket guarantees are from Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) and IADI (2005, 2008). We complement these data sources with data from national deposit insurance funds. 
There is considerable heterogeneity in terms of the time-period over which such guarantees were extended. For 
instance, various countries (e.g. Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey) extended blanket guarantees during 2004-05. 
Similarly, some countries (e.g. Australia, Hungary, and Portugal) extended the support beyond the 2007-2009 crisis to 
cover 2010 and 2011.  
16 The post-2010 coefficient is subsumed in year dummies and hence is not reported in the table. 
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our measures of systematic tail risk and the post 2010 or the SIFI dummy (the blanket guarantee 
dummy) are positive (negative) and statistically significant at customary levels.17  
In summary, the findings discussed in this section suggest that bank boards assign importance 
to systematic tail risk for forced CEO turnovers when there is a major variation in the costs that 
the exposure to this risk generates for shareholders and the bank.  
5. Conclusions  
Our analysis shows that the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover (but not of a voluntary 
turnover) is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. Thus, large bank CEOs do seem to 
bear some costs of increasing the idiosyncratic tail risk of their banks. Furthermore, the relation 
with idiosyncratic tail risk is stronger in less concentrated banking industries and in the presence 
of stakeholders that have more to lose from an increase in this risk. In general, we document that 
idiosyncratic tail risk offers information to assess CEOs’ decision making that is different from 
what can be inferred from accounting and market measures of performance and idiosyncratic 
volatility.  
Finally, we show that the lack of importance of systematic tail risk that we observe over the full 
sample period for CEO dismissal does not imply this risk is fully independent from CEO choices.  
Our analysis documents that how bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail risk, and the role 
                                                 
17 An alternative explanation of our finding on blanket guarantees could be panic. Blanket guarantees are often 
associated with systemic crises where regulators might provide incentives to banks to retain CEOs to avoid 
exacerbating panic conditions in the system.  In the Online Appendix, we employ an alternative blanket guarantee 
dummy that takes a value equal to one only when the guarantee covers bank debt in non-systemic crisis periods. The 
test shows a decline in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk in non-crisis periods covered by 
blanket guarantees.  
  
30 
of this risk in the firing decision, depends on the benefits and costs that such exposure might 
generate for the bank.  
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution. 
This Table presents the distribution of our sample of 261 banks across 46 countries from 2005-2013. Panel A presents the sample by country 
and Panel B by year.  
 
 Observations Banks 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country 
Australia 40 2.01 5 1.92 
Austria 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Bahrain 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Belgium 22 1.10 3 1.15 
Brazil 17 0.85 2 0.77 
Canada 57 2.86 7 2.68 
Chile 14 0.70 2 0.77 
China 73 3.66 11 4.21 
Cyprus 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Czech Republic 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Denmark 25 1.25 3 1.15 
Finland 9 0.45 1 0.38 
France 34 1.71 4 1.53 
Germany 56 2.81 7 2.68 
Greece 49 2.46 6 2.30 
Hong Kong 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Hungary 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Iceland 2 0.10 1 0.38 
India 56 2.81 8 3.07 
Indonesia 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Ireland 23 1.15 3 1.15 
Israel 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Italy 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Japan 334 16.75 47 18.01 
Jordan 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Korea 39 1.96 6 2.30 
Luxembourg 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Malaysia 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Mexico 18 0.90 2 0.77 
Netherlands 18 1.00 3 1.15 
Norway 20 0.45 1 0.38 
Poland 17 0.85 2 0.77 
Portugal 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Russia 6 0.30 1 0.38 
Saudi Arabia 26 1.30 5 1.92 
Singapore 27 1.35 3 1.15 
South Africa 44 2.21 5 1.92 
Spain 48 2.41 6 2.30 
Sweden 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Switzerland 30 1.50 4 1.53 
Taiwan 85 4.26 12 4.60 
Thailand 51 2.56 6 2.30 
Turkey 34 1.71 5 1.92 
UAE 9 0.45 1 0.38 
United Kingdom 59 2.96 8 3.07 
United States 335 16.80 43 16.48 
Total  1994 100% 261 100% 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year  
Year Observations Turnovers Forced Turnovers 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2005 186 24 8.82 7 9.46 
2006 207 22 8.09 4 5.40 
2007 220 27 9.93 6 8.11 
2008 236 28 10.29 13 17.57 
2009 239 44 16.18 11 14.86 
2010 241 35 12.87 7 9.46 
2011 228 25 9.19 4 5.41 
2012 216 29 10.66 10 13.51 
2013 221 38 13.97 12 16.22 
Total 1994 272 100% 74 100% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix: Tail Risk, Return and Volatility Measures. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of tail risk measures while Panel B shows summary statistics for return and volatility.  All variables are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. Panel C provides Spearman 
(above) and Pearson (below) correlations between the risk and return measures. We represent descriptive statistics for our original sample consisting of 1994 observations. The t-statistics provided here are obtained using tests 
of differences in means and the z-statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) – (1) (5) – (2)   (7) (8) (9) (7) – (1) (8) – (2) 
Panel A:  Tail Risk Measures                    
Idiosyncratic ES 1722 2.062 2.185 0.616  74 2.253 2.463 0.576 2.775*** 2.877***  198 2.107 2.309 0.630 0.942 1.092 
Systematic ES 1722 2.944 3.060 1.006  74 3.503 3.928 0.842 5.545*** 5.033***  198 3.018 3.267 1.013 0.974 0.983 
Panel B: Return and Volatility Measures                   
Idiosyncratic Returns 1722 -0.045 -0.039 0.166  74 -0.106 -0.089 0.202 -2.594** -2.590**  198 -0.053 -0.053 0.166 -0.648 -0.755 
Systematic Returns 1722 0.135 0.130 0.315  74 0.061 0.079 0.350 -1.775* -1.559  198 0.111 0.129 0.333 -0.948 -0.761 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 1722 0.205 0.189 0.091  74 0.245 0.224 0.104 3.272*** 3.295***  198 0.211 0.208 0.095 0.904 0.991 
Systematic Volatility 1722 0.256 0.234 0.106  74 0.294 0.276 0.111 2.864*** 2.996***  198 0.266 0.244 0.111 1.198 1.088 
 
Panel C: Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Idiosyncratic ES 1 0.405 -0.315 -0.167 0.894 0.489 
(2) Systematic ES 0.350 1 -0.048 -0.324 0.414 0.834 
(3) Idiosyncratic Return -0.337 -0.086 1 -0.172 -0.353 -0.117 
(4) Systematic Return -0.110 -0.366 -0.199 1 -0.177 -0.301 
(5) Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.805 0.522 -0.415 -0.166 1 0.587 
(6) Systematic Volatility 0.434 0.815 -0.140 -0.297 0.616 1 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Bank Fundamentals, Governance and Country Characteristics. 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics of all other variables which have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The t-statistics provided here are obtained using tests of differences in means and the z-
statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat  N Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat z-stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) – (1) (5) – (2)   (7) (8) (9) (7) – (1) (8) – (2) 
Panel A: Bank Fundamentals                   
Profitability 1722 -0.110 -0.004 0.782  74 -0.505 -0.458 0.902 -3.708*** -4.182***  198 -0.203 -0.104 0.820 -1.519 -1.730* 
Industry Profitability  1722 0.009 0.009 0.009  74 0.009 0.006 0.009 -0.690 -0.541  198 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.652 0.603 
Bank Size 1722 18.362 18.070 1.286  74 19.131 19.056 1.503 4.335*** 4.390***  198 18.342 18.136 1.162 -0.222 0.327 
Bank Capital 1722 7.117 6.547 2.625  72 5.912 5.609 2.510 -3.984*** -3.988***  198 7.000 6.193 2.679 -0.587 -0.825 
Charter Value 1722 1.026 1.013 0.055  74 1.004 1.002 0.035 -5.056*** -2.984***  198 1.024 1.010 0.056 -0.301 -0.645 
Panel B: Governance 
Characteristics                   
Board Size 1722 2.537 2.565 0.334  74 2.550 2.565 0.384 0.296 0.549  198 2.529 2.565 0.316 -0.331 -0.179 
Independent Directors 1722 0.477 0.500 0.293  74 0.564 0.542 0.225 3.204*** 2.401**  198 0.462 0.500 0.277 -0.706 -0.784 
CEO Power 1719 1.119 1.000 0.635  74 0.851 1.000 0.589 -3.815*** -3.557***  197 1.030 1.000 0.614 -1.916* -1.901* 
Insider Ownership 1581 30.162 22.995 27.688  68 33.001 28.414 31.754 0.725 0.107  186 36.816 30.095 29.014 2.972*** 3.022*** 
Risk Governance 1722 1.447 2.000 0.732  74 1.676 2.000 0.552 3.444*** 2.496**  198 1.460 2.000 0.717 0.241 0.144 
Supervisory Power 1672 11.175 12.000 1.873  73 10.712 11.000 2.038 -1.906* -1.882*  192 11.172 12.000 1.696 -0.025 -0.726 
Institutional Ownership 1660 31.256 24.880 23.010  69 33.027 28.930 22.790 0.631 0.737  191 26.653 20.540 22.199 -2.703*** -2.890*** 
Panel C: Country Characteristics                   
Bank Concentration 1722 -2.582 -2.717 0.702  74 -2.466 -2.436 0.741 1.321 1.307  198 -2.540 -2.715 0.658 0.852 1.000 
Director Liability Index 1722 6.020 6.000 2.268  74 5.838 5.000 2.021 -0.754 -0.885  198 5.682 6.000 2.141 -2.090** -2.018** 
Activity Restrictions 1722 11.904 13.000 3.302  74 11.095 11.000 3.150 -2.160** -2.882**  198 11.965 13.000 3.304 0.243 0.293 
Development 1722 35.153 35.455 19.732  74 37.622 44.195 20.851 0.999 1.093  198 31.552 34.973 19.441 -2.464** -2.257** 
Fiscal Capacity 1722 -3.720 -3.586 4.058  74 -3.600 -3.021 3.870 0.260 0.607  198 -3.997 -3.618 4.159 -0.890 -0.599 
Size of Economy 1722 14.264 14.348 1.572  74 13.985 13.974 1.338 -1.743* -1.764*  198 14.137 14.073 1.518 -1.110 -0.946 
Inflation 1722 2.454 2.200 2.384  74 2.954 2.650 2.392 1.762* 2.240**  198 2.722 2.300 2.775 1.304 0.765 
 
 
  
 
38 
Table 4 
CEO Turnover and Idiosyncratic and Systematic Expected Shortfall (ES). 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. 
The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. A positive 
coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the hazard rate for a CEO to be replaced and hence shortens the expected tenure. Idiosyncratic 
ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of residual returns from the market model and the systematic ES is the expected return below 
the 5th percentile of predicted returns from the market model, as specified in equation (2). For consistency, the systematic and idiosyncratic returns 
have also been estimated following Jenter and Kannan (2015). All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The z-
statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.785*** 0.080 0.684** -0.133 
 (2.915) (0.286) (2.408) (-0.376) 
Systematic ES 0.029 0.101 0.019 0.099 
 (0.263) (1.548) (0.129) (1.145) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 0.695 0.257 -0.570 0.797 
 (0.565) (0.229) (-0.372) (0.661) 
Systematic Returns -0.622 0.107 -0.881 0.271 
 (-1.458) (0.428) (-1.541) (0.800) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 6.008*** -1.340 5.087** -0.365 
 (3.327) (-0.581) (1.960) (-0.142) 
Systematic Volatility -1.287 -4.191** -0.731 -3.316 
 (-0.428) (-2.239) (-0.192) (-1.284) 
Profitability -0.725*** -0.210 -0.534*** -0.193 
 (-3.076) (-1.288) (-2.947) (-0.983) 
Industry Profitability -0.431** -0.044 -0.292* -0.018 
 (-2.522) (-0.216) (-1.662) (-0.074) 
Bank Size 0.760*** 0.022 0.571*** 0.105 
 (4.846) (0.150) (5.277) (0.785) 
Bank Size2 0.089 -0.080* 0.144** -0.125*** 
 (1.182) (-1.744) (2.254) (-2.937) 
Bank Capital -0.111 -0.099* -0.158** -0.101* 
 (-1.538) (-1.770) (-2.072) (-1.666) 
Charter Value -5.111 0.866 -5.131* -1.185 
 (-1.613) (0.295) (-1.829) (-0.374) 
Board Size   -0.498 -0.573* 
   (-1.628) (-1.757) 
Independent Directors   0.794 0.697 
   (0.824) (1.081) 
CEO Power   -0.785*** -0.590** 
   (-4.257) (-2.316) 
Insider Ownership   0.005 0.006 
   (0.999) (1.224) 
Risk Governance   -0.288 -0.006 
   (-1.301) (-0.043) 
Supervisory Power   0.103 0.075 
   (0.879) (1.089) 
Institutional Ownership   0.012** -0.014** 
   (2.430) (-1.971) 
Bank Concentration -0.392 0.024 -0.585* -0.120 
 (-1.306) (0.111) (-1.741) (-0.539) 
Director Liability Index 0.188*** -0.111** 0.183** -0.048 
 (3.328) (-2.509) (2.134) (-0.978) 
Activity Restrictions 0.075 -0.016 0.040 -0.001 
 (1.595) (-0.496) (0.821) (-0.010) 
Development 0.004 -0.018** 0.005 -0.025** 
 (0.335) (-2.014) (0.392) (-2.291) 
Fiscal Capacity 0.002 -0.058 -0.010 -0.073 
 (0.053) (-1.597) (-0.242) (-1.278) 
Size of Economy -0.692*** 0.064 -0.754*** 0.165 
 (-4.230) (0.603) (-3.724) (1.324) 
Inflation 0.217*** 0.014 0.214*** -0.036 
 (3.609) (0.164) (3.101) (-0.469) 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -420.1 -1257 -343.8 -1045 
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Table 5 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is the Impact of Idiosyncratic Expected Shortfall (ES) due to a Poor Performance Effect? 
This Table reports sub-sample tests on the relationship between forced CEO Turnover and ES. Column (1) reports the estimates from the 
competing-risks hazard regression after excluding from the sample banks with idiosyncratic return below the sample median. Column (2) reports 
the estimates after excluding banks with (simultaneously) low idiosyncratic performance (below the sample median) and high idiosyncratic volatility 
(above the sample median). The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 Excluding Low Returns Excluding Low Returns + High Volatility  
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.347* 1.214* 
 (1.797) (1.736) 
Systematic ES 0.076 0.031 
 (0.279) (0.123) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 2.244 3.013 
 (0.294) (0.512) 
Systematic Returns -0.638 -0.363 
 (-0.624) (-0.383) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 2.748 6.473 
 (0.441) (1.109) 
Systematic Volatility 10.399 7.659 
 (1.236) (1.094) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 872 1,143 
Log-likelihood -123.3 -145.3 
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Table 6 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Impact of Bank Market Concentration. 
This Table estimates competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a 
CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Bank Concentration is measured as the log of 
the Herfindahl index of bank deposits in each country in column (1) and as the log of the market share of bank deposits held by top-4 banks in 
each country in column (2). A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to 
changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The z-statistics are shown 
in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 
 HHI of bank deposits % Market share of Top 4 Banks 
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.054*** 1.067*** 
 (3.080) (2.796) 
Systematic ES 0.017 -0.024 
 (0.108) (-0.140) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Bank Concentration -1.112** -3.521*** 
 (-2.408) (-3.938) 
Systematic ES * Bank Concentration 0.084 0.207 
 (1.210) (1.365) 
Bank Concentration -0.752** -1.266** 
 (-2.521) (-2.520) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.484 -0.090 
 (-0.323) (-0.050) 
Systematic Returns -0.951 -0.833* 
 (-1.638) (-1.700) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.458* 7.774*** 
 (1.784) (2.642) 
Systematic Volatility -0.619 0.613 
 (-0.162) (0.136) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -339.4 -337.1 
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Table 7 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Which Bank Stakeholders Care More About Tail Risks?  
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is 
estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. A positive coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other 
variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. For brevity, only relevant covariates are shown in each Panel. The z-statistics 
are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.692** 0.852*** 0.693* 0.637** 
 (2.197) (2.723) (1.858) (2.122) 
Systematic ES 0.087 0.051 0.075 0.012 
 (0.656) (0.322) (0.485) (0.082) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.588*    
 (1.799)    
Systematic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.021    
 (0.385)    
Idiosyncratic ES * Insider Ownership  0.020*   
  (1.746)   
Systematic ES * Insider Ownership  0.001   
  (0.756)   
Idiosyncratic ES * Supervisory Power   -0.073  
   (-0.356)  
Systematic ES * Supervisory Power   0.035  
   (1.518)  
Idiosyncratic ES * Institutional Ownership    0.003 
    (0.262) 
Systematic ES * Institutional Ownership    -0.002 
    (-1.275) 
Subordinated Debt -1.413    
 (-0.084)    
Insider Ownership  0.003   
  (0.727)   
Supervisory Power   0.066  
   (0.563)  
Institutional Ownership    0.014** 
    (2.444) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.654 -1.352 -0.585 -0.708 
 (-0.378) (-0.847) (-0.356) (-0.455) 
Systematic Returns -1.199** -0.862 -0.962 -0.828 
 (-2.201) (-1.456) (-1.577) (-1.326) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.145* 5.490* 5.498** 5.830** 
 (1.780) (1.910) (2.047) (2.236) 
Systematic Volatility -1.365 -1.606 -2.237 -1.081 
 (-0.447) (-0.380) (-0.527) (-0.269) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,449 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -318 -343.1 -344.9 -344.1 
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Table 8 
Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is Systematic Tail Risk Exogenous? 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is 
estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Column (1) uses a post 2010 
dummy that equals one for the post-2010 period and zero otherwise. Column (2) uses SIFI as an indicator variable that equals one for banks that 
are systemically important financial institutions. Column (3) uses Blanket Guarantee as an indicator variable that equals one for the time period 
over which bank liabilities in each country were insured. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the 
sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the 
Appendix. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.184*** 0.899** 0.533* 
 (2.719) (2.211) (1.832) 
Systematic ES 0.016 0.030 0.038 
 (0.089) (0.172) (0.353) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Post-2010 -0.776   
 (-1.634)   
Systematic ES * Post-2010 0.201*   
 (1.768)   
Idiosyncratic ES * SIFI  -1.869  
  (-1.620)  
Systematic ES * SIFI  0.312*  
  (1.960)  
Idiosyncratic ES * Blanket Guarantee   4.674 
   (1.434) 
Systematic ES * Blanket Guarantee   -0.236* 
   (-1.686) 
SIFI  -0.512  
  (-0.523)  
Blanket Guarantee   -1.489 
   (-0.752) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.899 -0.603 -1.130 
 (-0.594) (-0.345) (-0.713) 
Systematic Returns -0.840 -0.889 -0.755 
 (-1.421) (-1.638) (-1.433) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.775* -2.599 5.131* 
 (1.662) (-0.524) (1.711) 
Systematic Volatility -2.537 5.512* -1.516 
 (-0.543) (1.923) (-0.447) 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -345.7 -344.6 -340.2 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 
Variable Definitions. 
This Table shows variable definitions. Risk measures and country characteristics are measured at the calendar year-end and bank financials 
and governance characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end.  
 
Variable Definition 
Idiosyncratic ES Average residual returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market model 
in equation (2), multiplied by -1. 
Systematic ES Average predicted returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market model 
in equation (2), multiplied by -1. 
Idiosyncratic Returns % Annualized daily values of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed 
at yearly intervals. 
Systematic Returns % Annualized daily values of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed 
at yearly intervals. 
Idiosyncratic Volatility Standard deviation of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly 
intervals. 
Systematic Volatility Standard deviation of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at yearly 
intervals. 
Profitability ROA – mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Industry Profitability Mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Bank Size Natural log of total assets. 
Bank Capital Book value of Equity/Book value of Assets, expressed in percentages.  
Charter Value Market value of Assets/Book value of Assets, where market value is the sum of market value of equity and book 
value of liabilities 
Board Size Natural log of the number of board members. 
Independent Directors % of independent directors on the board. 
CEO Power Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: CEO also serves as the Chairman and presence of 
an internal CEO. Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
Insider Ownership % of shares owned by insiders, excluding the CEO, in the bank, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Risk Governance Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: presence of a Chief Risk Officer and presence of 
Risk Committee. Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
Bank Concentration Log of Herfindahl Index for bank deposits in each country. 
Supervisory Power Extent of supervisory power to correct problems. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from the World 
Bank Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision. 
Institutional Ownership % of shares owned by institutional investors, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Crisis Indicator variable that equals one for each country-year combination that had a systemic banking crisis. 
Post-2010 Indicator variable that equals one for the post-2010 period, and zero otherwise. 
SIFI  Indicator variable that equals one for banks present in the list of global systemically important financial 
institutions by the Financial Stability Board post 2010 
Blanket Guarantee Indicator variable that equals one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured. 
Activity Restrictions Extent of regulatory restrictions placed on bank activities. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from 
the World Bank Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision. 
Development GDP per capita (million US$). 
Fiscal Capacity  Government revenues minus expenditures scaled by GDP.  
Size of Economy Natural log of GDP (million US$). 
Inflation % inflation rate. 
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CEO Dismissal Risk and Bank Risk-Taking 
 
 
 
Table B.1 
Does CEO Dismissal Risk influence Bank Risk-Taking? 
This Table reports the estimates from fixed effect regressions that examine the impact of CEO dismissal risk on idiosyncratic and systematic 
tail risk. CEO dismissal risk is the predicted risk of termination for the CEO, obtained from a survival regression specified in column (2) of Table 
4, after excluding risk controls. Idiosyncratic ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of residual returns from the market model and the 
systematic ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of predicted returns from the market model, as specified in equation (2). All other 
variables are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include bank and year dummies. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis 
and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 Idiosyncratic ES Systematic ES 
 (1) (2) 
CEO Dismissal Risk 0.006 -0.001 
 (1.602) (-1.028) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,689 1,689 
R-squared 0.834 0.525 
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Alternative Measures of Tail Risk 
 
Table B.2 
Robustness Test: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Measures of Tail Risk.  
This Table presents the descriptive statistics for alternative market-based measures (VaR and Skewness) and an accounting-based measure 
(Accounting Downside Risk) of tail risk. For ease of comparability, we represent descriptive statistics for our most conservative sample used in the 
main analyses consisting of No-turnover sample (n=1722, n=1722, n=1484), Forced turnover sample (n=74, n=74, n=65), and Voluntary turnover 
sample (n=198, n=198, n=174) for VaR, Skewness, and Downside Risk, respectively. VaR is measured as the daily bank return corresponding to 
the 5th percentile of the realized yearly return distribution. Idiosyncratic VaR is the idiosyncratic return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the 
residuals from the market model, while the Systematic VaR is the return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the predicted return from the market 
model. Skewness is defined as [(VaR50% - VaR5%) – (VaR95% - VaR50%)]/(VaR95% - VaR5%), following Bushman et al. (2015). We compute the 
idiosyncratic and systematic Skewness using the idiosyncratic and systematic VaR estimates. We multiply each of these measures by minus one to 
keep the interpretation of the results consistent with our previous discussion; namely, higher values of each measure of Skewness indicate higher 
tail risk. Accounting Downside Risk is measured using a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s ROA is lower than 1.645 standard deviations 
below the mean (corresponding to the 5th percentile). The idiosyncratic (or unconditional firm-specific) component of Accounting Downside Risk 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s ROA is below the 5th percentile but the industry ROA is above the 5th percentile. Similarly, the 
systematic (or conditional system-wide) component of Accounting Downside Risk is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s ROA is below 
the 5th percentile and the industry ROA is below the 5th percentile. There are 218 crash events, representing 14.7% of our sample, over our sample 
period and the distribution of crash events over our sample period is comparable to Cohen et al. (2014). Mean ROA and the standard deviation of 
ROA are computed by using a rolling window of 7 years. 
 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Idiosyncratic VaR 1.713 1.669 0.697  1.937 1.999 0.723  1.762 1.810 0.709 
Systematic VaR 2.492 2.328 1.109  3.135 3.388 1.035  2.568 2.507 1.120 
Idiosyncratic Skewness 0.030 0.042 0.126  0.048 0.049 0.077  0.014 0.040 0.171 
Systematic Skewness 0.020 0.010 0.110  0.018 0.015 0.148  0.009 0.008 0.118 
Idiosyncratic Accounting Downside Risk 0.091 0.000 0.288  0.292 0.000 0.458  0.086 0.000 0.281 
Systematic Accounting Downside Risk 0.042 0.000 0.200  0.077 0.000 0.269  0.034 0.000 0.183 
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Table B.3 
Correlation of Alternative Tail Risk Measures with Volatility. 
This Table presents the Spearman (above) and Pearson (below) correlation between the tail risk measures described in Table B.2 and between 
these measures and idiosyncratic and systematic volatility.  
 
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk components (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) VaR 1 0.146 0.076 0.924 
(2) Skewness 0.267 1 0.039 0.224 
(3) Accounting Downside Risk 0.076 0.022 1 0.098 
(4) Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.886 0.225 0.103 1 
Panel B: Systematic Risk components     
(1) VaR 1 0.223 0.270 0.834 
(2) Skewness 0.279 1 0.147 0.207 
(3) Accounting Downside Risk 0.266 0.083 1 0.319 
(4) Systematic Volatility 0.819 0.179 0.373 1 
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Table B.4 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Measures of Tail Risk 
This Table reports the estimates of competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. 
The models are estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. All the controls 
are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include year dummies. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 VaR  Skewness  Accounting Downside Risk 
 (1)  (3)  (4) 
 Forced Voluntary  Forced Voluntary  Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic Tail Risk 0.770* -0.258  5.326*** -2.030  0.644** -0.447 
 (1.951) (-0.725)  (3.409) (-1.453)  (2.339) (-1.560) 
Systematic Tail Risk 0.241 0.094  -0.774 0.945  -0.116 -0.353 
 (0.826) (0.461)  (-0.436) (0.727)  (-0.210) (-0.504) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.326 0.972  1.474 0.367  -1.149 1.528 
 (-0.205) (0.923)  (0.906) (0.358)  (-0.820) (1.112) 
Systematic Returns -0.792 0.182  -1.211** 0.366  -0.544 0.112 
 (-1.449) (0.593)  (-2.059) (1.194)  (-1.109) (0.396) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  5.233* 1.608  8.772*** -0.060  7.650*** -0.231 
 (1.663) (0.527)  (3.856) (-0.036)  (3.822) (-0.133) 
Systematic Volatility -2.565 -2.728  -1.988 -1.868  0.793 -1.141 
 (-0.733) (-0.944)  (-1.085) (-1.118)  (0.406) (-0.500) 
Other Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722  1,722 1,722  1,481 1,481 
Log-likelihood -346.4 -1046  -341.8 -1043  -318 -882.1 
 
  
  
49 
Alternative Econometric Methods 
 
 
Table B5 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Econometric Methods.  
This Table reports the estimates from alternative econometric methods. Column (1) reports the estimates from multinomial logit regressions 
that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with the dependent variable that takes the value of 
one if there is a forced turnover event and two if there is a voluntary turnover event, and zero otherwise. Column (2) reports estimates from Cox 
hazard regressions that examine the hazard of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated with a CEO’s dismissal risk measured as the CEO’s 
tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. All voluntary turnovers are treated as censored, following Brookman and Thistle (2009) and 
Jenter and Kannan (2015). A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. All controls are 
defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include year dummies. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 Multinomial Logit  Cox Proportional Hazards 
 (1)  (2) 
 Forced Voluntary  Forced 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.578* -0.129  0.673** 
 (1.719) (-0.538)  (2.365) 
Systematic ES 0.049 0.083  0.049 
 (0.633) (1.484)  (0.295) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 1.209 1.816  -0.811 
 (0.795) (1.279)  (-0.517) 
Systematic Returns -0.692 0.098  -0.908 
 (-1.301) (0.343)  (-1.399) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.175* 0.120  5.197* 
 (1.742) (0.064)  (1.749) 
Systematic Volatility -2.219 -3.400*  -1.858 
 (-0.729) (-1.789)  (-0.412) 
Other Controls YES  YES 
Time Dummies YES  YES 
Observations 1,722  1,722 
Log-likelihood -745.4  -335.5 
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Minimum CEO Tenure and Crisis Effect 
 
Table B.6 
CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Additional Tests 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. 
The model is estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Panel (A) reports 
the estimates after excluding all those turnover events that take place less than two years of a CEO taking her office. Panel (B) controls for the 
impact of systemic crises using Crisis, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every country-year combination in which a systemic 
banking crisis occurred (as identified by Laeven and Valencia, 2012), and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases 
the hazard of cause-specific CEO turnover. All controls are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include year dummies. The 
z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Minimum Stipulated Time a CEO Should Have Held Office Before 
Leaving. 
(1) 
Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.609* -0.149 
 (1.821) (-0.424) 
Systematic ES -0.026 0.064 
 (-0.137) (0.709) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.374 1.099 
 (-0.197) (1.201) 
Systematic Returns -1.191 0.247 
 (-1.624) (0.725) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 6.310* -0.345 
 (1.745) (-0.143) 
Systematic Volatility 0.269 -2.654 
 (0.054) (-0.941) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,690 1,690 
Log-likelihood -263.5 -908.3 
Panel B: Controlling for the Impact of Crisis.   
Idiosyncratic ES 0.824*** -0.332 
 (2.893) (-1.038) 
Systematic ES 0.023 0.092 
 (0.147) (1.046) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.603 1.079 
 (-0.410) (0.906) 
Systematic Returns -0.809 0.236 
 (-1.341) (0.664) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.387* 1.015 
 (1.692) (0.421) 
Systematic Volatility -2.066 -2.150 
 (-0.496) (-0.893) 
Crisis 0.388 -1.074*** 
 (0.953) (-3.445) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -345.9 -1039 
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Alternative Explanation of the Blanket Guarantee Effect 
 
 
Table B7 
Forced CEO Turnover and Tail Risk: Alternative Measure of Blanket Guarantee 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is 
estimated with a CEO’s turnover risk measured as the CEO’s tenure that is right censored as of December 31, 2013. Blanket Guarantee is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the guarantee covers bank debt in non-systemic crisis periods. We extract crisis data from the Systemic Banking Crises 
Database available on the IMF website. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO 
turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk. All variables are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. All models include 
year dummies. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.647** 
 (2.182) 
Systematic ES 1.863 
 (0.168) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Blanket Guarantee 3.976 
 (1.178) 
Systematic ES * Blanket Guarantee -0.594* 
 (-1.745) 
Blanket Guarantee -0.644 
 (-0.391) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.433 
 (-0.275) 
Systematic Returns -0.905** 
 (-1.973) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.184* 
 (1.745) 
Systematic Volatility -1.321 
 (-0.349) 
Other Controls YES 
Time Dummies YES 
Observations 1,722 
Log-likelihood -343.1 
. 
 
